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Courage is first among virtues in heroic epic and in cultures of honor. Men cared to be known for their courage. It not only took courage to fight well, 
but the issue often being fought over was who had 
more of it. Courage was competitive. Men were 
ranked according to the degree of courage they 
possessed. Arguments arose as to what counted 
as truly courageous, what the perfect form of 
the virtue was, and what were lesser though still 
worthy semblances of it. Not only philosophers 
theorized about courage: warriors, politicians 
and spectators did so as well. The stakes were 
high, and so there emerged a politics of courage, a 
jockeying to define your performances as worthier 
than your competitor’s.
Thus we have Pericles of Athens arguing—and 
trying to convince his fellow citizens—that 
Athenian courage is superior to Spartan courage. 
His claim is that courage came naturally to 
Athenians, while Spartans had to be force-fed 
theirs by laborious, state-imposed training: “The 
prize for courage,” he says, “will surely be awarded 
most justly to those who best know the difference 
between hardship and pleasure and still are never 
tempted to shrink from danger.” Wishful thinking? 
Rigging the criteria of the prize for courage? Or just 
trying to buck up the citizenry for the war about to 
be embarked upon?
The Power of Shame
Move now to Sparta some 30 years earlier. One 
Spartan, Aristodemus by name, was denied the 
first prize for courage at the Battle of Plataea in 
479 BCE, though he had rushed forward in fury 
and routed a large force of Persians. The prize 
was instead given to Posidonius, a man who had 
fought bravely but held his place in the phalanx 
line. Aristodemus’s courage was judged inferior 
because he wanted to die in battle to redeem 
honor he had lost at Thermopylae, whereas 
Posidonius had fought bravely without any wish to 
die. Posidonius knew something of a good life. He 
wanted to come away alive if he could, though he 
would die if he must.
Sounds like a perfectly reasonable way to rank 
the two performances, but Herodotus, to whom we 
owe the story, smells a fish; in his view Aristodemus 
was easily the most courageous fighter that day. The 
Spartans simply were not going to give a prize to 
Aristodemus, because he was Aristodemus and his 
deeds, no matter how effective and how glorious, 
did not count. Why?
A year earlier, Aristodemus had been one of 
Leonidas’s 300 at Thermopylae, but Leonidas had 
excused him along with another man, Eurytus, for 
having severe eye infections. The two nearly blind 
men retired to a place several miles to the rear. 
Word of the battle came to them: Eurytus ordered 
his slave to lead him back to the battlefield to rejoin 
his comrades to die with them, while Aristodemus 
took advantage of his excuse to stay away. Eurytus 
was Aristodemus’s bad luck, for they made a 
sorry contrast. Aristodemus returned to Sparta, to 
unrelenting shame and loathing. 
Contrasting Courage
The politics of courage is with us today. 
People still care intensely about courage, and 
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we’re still trying to stack the deck in our 
own favor. Determining who has courage, 
what actions count, who gets the prize, 
is disputed now no less than in the Iliad. 
Look whom we call heroes and claim are 
courageous. In our day, we hear people 
praised for their courage for getting in an 
elevator if claustrophobic, getting on an 
airplane if stricken with fears of flying, 
investing in a Silicon Valley start-up, or, if a 
politician, for taking a position that might 
cause his approval rating to drop for a few 
weeks, while a Tibetan who incinerates 
himself for a cause he conceives much 
greater than himself is deemed fanatic or 
an example of the cheapness of life “over 
there,” as was the case when the average 
Japanese soldier in World War II did deeds 
for which Americans won Medals of Honor, 
or Brits Victoria Crosses. 
Some might lament the debasing of 
courage’s coin, for it is surely debased, 
but others might rejoice that the virtue 
has been rescued from danger and death, 
softened and broadened, making it more 
easily available to all by eliminating risk to 
life and limb, while still employing martial 
metaphors to describe takeovers and 
acquisitions, the so-called entrepreneurial 
risk. And not just undertaking monetary 
risks, but courage is ascribed to resisting 
the temptation of pleasure too: the 
courage to resist lust or gluttony. But it 
was ever thus. Theories of courage cannot 
escape tendentiousness. 
Indeed, Plato claims that philosophers, 
not warriors, are the purest exemplars 
of courage. The former, he says, do not 
fear death because they know life is really 
something best gotten over with, while the 
latter face death because of a greater fear 
of shame. He tries to preempt criticism 
of this preposterous claim by putting it 
in Socrates’ mouth as he awaits death. 
No one doubted Socrates’ courage. He 
was rather vain about it himself and, as a 
younger man, had won quite a reputation 
as a fearless soldier. 
Needless to say, Plato’s view is hardly 
disinterested; one detects the influence of 
the philosophers’ lobby. Some of the braver 
people I have met do not happen to be in 
humanities departments. A good portion 
of the wondrousness of Joshua Lawrence 
Chamberlain’s stand at Little Round Top at 
Gettysburg in the American Civil War was 
that he managed it even though he was a 
classics professor. 
Fortitude vs. Aggression
The broad view of courage, the view 
that would make resisting pleasure a matter 
of courage, is hardly the dominant view, 
nor is it a recent invention of the American 
self-esteem and self-help movements. Plato 
articulates it in an early dialogue. Socrates 
asks Laches, a well-known general, to 
define courage, and when Laches comes 
up with a quite reasonable definition from 
combat—“remaining at one’s post and not 
running away”—Socrates presses him to 
expand it to include those “who are not 
only courageous against pain or fear, but 
mighty to contend against desires and 
pleasures.” Plato thus may well be the first 
to grant courage to a recovering addict or 
to the person who says no to a tempting 
adulterous affair, thus emptying courage of 
precisely what makes it the theme of the 
greatest stories ever told.
The stricter martial view gets its 
classic formulation in Aristotle, who makes 
courage a matter of risking life and limb 
in war for one’s country, kin or people. 
The martial view is easily the dominant 
view, informing heroic literature and songs 
of triumph from Judea to the Germanic 
North all the way out to Iceland. Indeed, it 
is nearly a universal view of courage, and 
the broad view must be understood as a 
reaction to it, an attempt to steal a bit of 
martial courage’s luster, democratize it, or 
in a less friendly way of putting it, dumbing 
“The death camp and Gulag of the 20th century, the 
horrors of evil governments, succeed in making survival 
itself its own kind of courage.”
A visitor contemplates images of the Holocaust in an exhibition dedicated to the Nazi death camps at the Yad Vashem Holocaust 
Memorial’s museum in Jerusalem, Israel























And then the ambiguous cases, offense or defense is 
not clear, of self-immolating Buddhist monks who 
brought down the Diem regime, for whom taking it 
was a form of dishing it out.
The Courage of Defense
The courage of offense was and remained, 
with some notable exceptions, the preserve of men 
and, by widespread ideology across a multitude of 
cultures, upper-class men. The courage of defense, 
by obvious necessity and by definition, was no 
less at home on the battlefield than the courage of 
offense. But defensive courage had within it seeds 
of expansion, for it was called to do service in a 
multitude of miserable and horrific conditions, not 
just on the battlefield.
Look how the courage of defense begins to 
colonize other domains. The ability to take it, not 
to dish it out, becomes the prize-winning form of 
courage, resulting in an express ticket to heaven 
when it came in the form of martyrdom, specifically 
Christian martyrdom. The hagiographical sources 
devoted to martyrdom put courage, as much as 
faith, squarely in issue, and rather make the former 
more to be marveled at than the latter. And women 
were no less eligible than men, rather more so 
in fact, for some of the most stunningly heroic of 
martyrs were women: Saints Blandina in the second 
century and Perpetua in the third. They couldn’t 
be broken morally, even though every part of their 
bodies had been broken. But nonetheless, the 
passivity of being racked, flayed, fed to beasts in 
these saints’ lives was reconceptualized as offensive 
action by the martyrs. The martyr was depicted 
as a gladiator, a fighter, wrestling with the devil, 
delivering blows as she lay bound, roasted and 
spitted. Martyrdom and the courage of defense 
borrowed its laudatory metaphors and imagery 
from offense; it was parasitical on aggressive 
courage for all its diction, for its songs of glory. 
In the Germanic North, it took quite a dose 
of disbelief to accept a God who let himself be 
crucified, so the crucifixion was recast as a battle 
against the cross itself and the battle was extended 
to the next day; by having Christ’s descent into hell 
look ever more like a military campaign against 
Satan, passion became action. Offense retained 
its conceptual allure even when the action was 
turning one’s cheek to get slapped again, for as Paul 
recognized in his reformulation of the Sermon on 
the Mount’s message, forgiveness and passivity 
were offensive weapons. In Paul’s words: it was like 
pouring hot coals on the heads of your enemies. 
Passivity and forgiveness in the Stoic and Christian 
scheme were just moves in the honor game of 
warring ideologies: heroic aggressive honor vs. 
Christian and Stoic fortitude. (I apologize that 
my account is a Western one; were I to add in the 
East it would exceed my comfortable knowledge 
base.) The contrasts are not only substantive but 
also stylistic. Offense tended to be noisier, favoring 
intense expenditures of energy in short bursts with 
long, lazy intervals in between: gender it male. 
Defense required stolidity, constancy and, above all, 
endurance: call it feminine if you are so inclined. 
And the historical record is filled with examples 
of those who were courage itself on defense, but of 
rather mediocre virtue on offense, and vice versa. 
it down (so as to make it more readily available to 
the intellectually inclined). 
Yet even within the confines of the narrower 
battle-oriented view of courage, two basic 
conceptions warred against each other as to which 
best represented the purest form. In a nutshell: 
was courage best exemplified by offense, marching 
into the teeth of danger, the charge; or was it best 
exemplified by defense, by refusal to quit one’s 
post, by not backing down, by patient suffering 
over time? Later, this dispute was captured by 
“Some might lament the debasing of courage’s 
coin . . . courage is ascribed to risking the 
temptation of pleasure too: the courage to 
resist lust or gluttony.”





















challenge and riposte, and again it was 
courage and toughness that was being 
contested. You think that slap on the face 
hurt? Here, take another shot, you cannot 
touch me.
As war became more mechanized, the 
virtues needed to endure, the courage of 
defense, martyr-like fortitude, began as a 
practical matter to dominate the battlefield 
itself, despite the charge never losing its 
primal allure. The image to keep in mind is 
the trenches of the Great War, where for all 
the extraordinary courage it took to go over 
the trench top, months could go by before 
one had to charge. And in the meantime, 
one had to suffer unrelenting mud, cold, 
filth, constant shelling, gas, the ubiquitous 
corpses and the stench of their rot, and the 
rats who ate them, the flies that hatched 
maggots in them, and the pain and itch of 
the lice and your own rotting trench feet. 
Take away the gas and shelling and some 
of the corpses and you have the endurance 
required of Roman legions doing duty 
on the Rhine, who mutinied on occasion 
because of the sheer misery of the cold and 
wet and a term of service that never seemed 
to end. By World War II, Eisenhower 
could formulate “real heroism” as “the 
uncomplaining acceptance of unendurable 
conditions.” 
The death camp and Gulag of the 20th 
century, the horrors of evil governments, 
succeed in making survival itself its own 
kind of courage, seeking to avoid death at 
all costs, thus turning traditional courage 
and cowardice on their heads. Tales of 
escape and corresponding tales of rescue, 
life-saving rather than death-dealing or 
death-enduring, begin to elicit their share 
of courage prizes: Victoria Crosses, Pour 
le Mérites and Medals of Honor become 
almost as likely to be won by medics and 
stretcher bearers as by the man who storms 
the machine-gun nest. 
Moral Courage
My politics of courage keeps mostly 
confined to the narrower Aristotelian view 
of facing real danger to life and limb, the 
courage demanded by war, feud and mean 
streets. So I will expand my account to 
raise the question of moral courage. 
Moral courage—the concept, that 
is—as distinguished from plain old 
courage, is a rather recent development; 
the term does not appear in English until 
the 19th century. It took a largely pacified 
society for people to think to distinguish 
stand-up-in-meeting kind of courage—the 
courage of risking ridicule, humiliation, 
loss of employment or social ostracism 
for speaking out against injustice, or of 
defying immoral or illegal orders from a 
superior—from plain old courage. Before 
then, to stand up against the judges trying 
to burn your neighbor as a witch or your 
cousin as a heretic could get you burned 
as one too. Your life was on the line. The 
young girl from the projects who testifies 
against the drug dealer whom she saw 
kill his girlfriend is showing plain old 
courage; her life unfortunately is very 
much on the line, and likely to be very 
short because of her testimony. We need 
no recourse to moral courage to find her 
worthy of admiration.
But moral courage bears one 
telling requisite that in some domains 
distinguishes it from physical courage. 
Moral courage is lonely courage. Physical 
courage is no less courageous for having the 
support of comrades on the left and right in 
a shield wall, and when it must be carried 
out alone, it is all the more admirable. But 
moral courage loses no small part of its 
virtue when it is backed by a substantial 
support group. It takes little courage, moral 
or otherwise, for instance, to speak out 
against war or against Israel’s policies in a 
university setting in the Western world.
Moral courage, though, cannot dispense 
with physical courage. Imagine the person 
who quite alone speaks out against an 
injustice in a meeting hostile to the moral 
and just position he voices, but who retracts 
his statement as soon as someone threatens 
to punch him once the meeting breaks up. 
Moral courage, to be entitled to its morals, or 
to its courage, cannot let itself be squelched 
by a threatening glance, or even by a good 
beating. Recall that girl testifying against the 
drug dealer, who was shaking like a leaf on 
the stand. No coward she. ❖
“Women were no less eligible than men, rather 
more so in fact, for some of the most stunningly 
heroic of martyrs were women.”
A stained glass window commemorating the martyrdom of  
Saint Blandina
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